Rural Reform and Fiji's Indigenous Sugarcane Growers: An Application of Stochastic Frontier Analysis by Kingi, Tanira T. & Kompas, Thomas
42
Pacific Economic BullEtin
 Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 2 © 2010 the australian national university
We examine the performance of Fiji’s indigenous sugarcane growers, 
measuring their technical efficiency using a stochastic frontier 
production function. Of particular interest are the cooperative or 
communal farming structures among new entrants into Fiji’s sugar 
industry. These structures are emerging in response to government 
rationalisation policies in agricultural support—from individuals to 
groups—and the growing emphasis from the indigenous community 
on economic activity to reflect community requirements, values and 
imperatives. Our study finds that growers who are members of a 
cooperative group have higher levels of technical efficiency than 
growers who live in villages and that their performance is on par with 
galala or independent growers. Group structures are used as vehicles 
to centralise management decision-making and pool resources, thereby 
overcoming experience and capital accumulation constraints. The 
research also shows that these structures provide a vital mechanism for 
aligning cultural values and legitimising individual economic activity 
that has communal benefits. This finding is not only important for 
Fiji’s struggling agricultural sector, it points a way forward for other 
South Pacific island nations and other countries where agricultural 
intensification is carried out on communally owned land. 
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The main purpose of this article is to examine 
the technical efficiency of Fiji’s indigenous 
sugarcane growers and provide evidence 
on factors influencing their performance. 
A key aspect we examine is the recent 
emergence of cooperative or communal 
farming structures that have been promoted 
by government agencies. These structures 
consist primarily of landowners who have 
recently entered the sugar industry as 
producers.
Sugar is Fiji’s main agricultural export 
and the country’s second largest export 
revenue earner behind tourism. Historically, 
the bulk of sugar production has been 
produced by Indo-Fijian farmers leasing 
land from the mataqali or Fiji’s indigenous 
landowning groups. In the past decade, 
however, the number of indigenous growers 
entering the sugar industry has increased 
significantly, prompted by the expiration 
of the 30-year agricultural leases from 1997. 
This trend is likely to continue.
The administration of lease transactions 
is controlled by a statutory body: the Native 
Land Trust Board (NLTB).1 New entrants 
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to the industry have received government 
and industry support, including financial 
grants and elementary training in crop 
husbandry and management. Additionally, 
there has been widespread encouragement 
of new and established indigenous cane 
growers to adopt traditional concepts to 
communal work (solesolevaki), whereby 
growers voluntarily pool resources and 
share information in an effort to improve 
farm efficiency. The precise number of 
these groups is difficult to determine as 
a significant proportion of cane growers 
regularly shares labour and machinery 
under informal arrangements. More 
recently, however, formal arrangements have 
emerged between new indigenous entrants 
into the industry as well as established 
growers. Government assistance through 
the Farming Assistance Scheme (FAS) 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Sugar and Land Resettlement (MASLR) 
and actively encouragement by the NLTB 
and the Fiji Development Bank (FDB 2003) 
has seen an increase in the establishment of 
formal entities.
Any initiative that increases the 
productive capability of new growers—to 
counter the loss of experienced tenants—
will be important in maintaining the supply 
of raw cane to the country’s ailing sugar 
mills. The timing is critical as the industry 
restructures to reduce its dependency on EU 
sugar subsidies as well as building capacity 
within the country’s rural production base 
to diversify into alternative products. Under 
the 1975 Lomé Convention (an agreement 
between the European Union and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries), Fiji and 
other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
sugar producers have received preferential 
prices for a defined quantity of sugar 
exported to the European Union. Since 
2007, the preferential prices under the 
former Lomé Convention (now the Cotonou 
Agreement) have been reduced, putting 
significant pressure on the restructuring of 
the production, processing and transport 
sectors. Recommendations for the reform 
of the production sector include a major 
reduction in the number of producers, along 
with an increase in the average farm size.
Against this background, we examine 
the impacts of rural economic development 
policies and agricultural reform programs, 
including Fiji’s cooperative societies, on the 
indigenous Fijian population. These policies 
and programs were designed to promote 
labour specialisation and to mitigate the 
effects of traditional or cultural obligations 
that led to inefficient resource use and low 
technical efficiency.
We hypothesise that technical efficiency 
will increase where economic activity takes 
place within a structure that is culturally 
acceptable and facilitates cooperation. 
The first factor—cultural alignment—is a 
powerful motivating factor whereby the 
benefits of economic activity are distributed 
beyond the individual to the wider group. 
These benefits can include tangible (for 
example, cash) and intangible (for example, 
status in the group) benefits. The second 
factor—cooperation—includes the sharing 
of resources among kin farmers to overcome 
individual deficiencies.
The remainder of this article is organised 
into four sections. Section two gives a brief 
overview of the cooperative literature 
and Fiji’s experience with cooperative 
societies, and examines the influence of 
Fiji’s agricultural and rural reform programs 
from the colonial period of the late 1800s to 
the renewal of agricultural leases beginning 
in the late 1990s. Section three outlines 
the theoretical and empirical framework, 
method and data sources; section four 
discusses the results and section five 
concludes with policy recommendations.
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Cooperatives and agricultural 
development in Fiji
Cooperatives and agriculture
Cooperatives have been a common organi-
sational structure within agricultural sectors 
of developing and industrialised nations. 
The term applies to an organisation whose 
assets are owned collectively by its mem-
bers or, as defined by Vitaliano (1983:1,079), 
‘an economic organisation whose residual 
claims are restricted to the agent group that 
supplies patronage under the organisation’s 
nexus of contracts’. Chaddad and Cook 
(2004) point out that in addition to residual 
claims (that is, the amount left over after 
all contracted payments to claim holders), 
ownership includes residual rights of con-
trol. Residual control rights are rights to 
make any decision regarding the use of an 
asset that is not assigned to other parties 
by contract.
In the case of cooperatives, the agent 
group or its members have no individual 
ownership right to the firm. Instead, they own 
the monetary value of their shares—leading 
to one of the main criticisms of cooperatives: 
collective ownership. Property rights and 
agency theorists (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972; Jensen and Meckling 1979; Fama and 
Jensen 1983) claim that cooperatives are 
inherently inefficient because the owners 
have only vaguely defined property rights, 
producing a suboptimal structure wherein 
organisational control is weakened, raising 
equity is difficult and the use of resources 
is problematic. An example of a collective 
ownership problem (or common property 
problem) in cooperatives is when new 
members join a cooperative and immediately 
have access to all assets that earlier members 
have accumulated. Additional membership 
dilutes the equity of the existing members 
(Nilsson 2001). The common property 
problem is articulated further by Borgen 
(2004), who argues that the disparity 
between a member’s contribution of equity 
and their benefit from the equity leads to 
free-rider behaviour between members and 
non-members and between existing and 
new members.
Williamson’s (1985) transaction-cost 
theory provides an alternative viewpoint 
on the rationale of cooperative enterprises, 
arguing that their existence reflects the 
organisation’s efforts to integrate either 
forwards or backwards in the value chain. 
Agricultural production and marketing 
cooperatives are commonly used in 
agriculture as mechanisms to reduce the 
production risks associated with: 1) the 
vagaries of bio-physical production systems; 
2) information asymmetry when selling to 
a monopsonist; or 3) the high transaction 
costs of selling to multiple independent 
traders. In these instances, it makes sense 
for farmers to take advantage not only of 
scale efficiencies in production but also 
cooperatively own the trading partner (for 
example, New Zealand’s milk-processing 
and marketing firm Fonterra is owned by 
14,000 supplier dairy farmers).
According to the theoretical arguments, 
cooperatives should always be less efficient 
than investor-owned firms; however, 
empirical studies of cooperatives reveal no 
definite pattern. One would assume that if 
cooperatives were inefficient they would be 
forced out of the market. Their continued 
existence is partially explained by Porter 
and Scully (1987), using an empirical study 
of the US dairy industry. These authors 
point out that US agricultural cooperatives 
enjoyed public (or government) support 
in the form of lower interest rates and tax 
concessions—although this assistance can 
be regarded as compensation for efficiency 
losses in exchange for the socially valuable 
tasks performed. In spite of the theoretical 
arguments against cooperatives, their use 
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in developing and industrialised countries 
suggests that there will be socioeconomic and 
political justifications for their existence.2 For 
others, socio-cultural reasons—including 
values such as equality, fairness and 
solidarity—justify a cooperative structure, 
even though these reasons often translate 
into economic advantages as a result of 
increased volume of product and economies 
of scale (Nilsson 2001).
Cooperative societies in Fiji
Cooperatives emerged in Fiji in the 1940s 
as a vehicle to promote economic activity 
within villages under the 1947 Co-operative 
Society Ordinance. By 1959, there were 87 
cooperatives; in 1965, there were 239; and 
by 1970, there were 600 (Fiji Parliamentary 
Paper, no.3, 1971–72, cited in Walter 
1974:149). While popular among Fijian 
communities and widely promoted by the 
Fijian administration, cooperatives were 
beset with flaws. According to Walter (1974), 
from their inception, these entities lacked any 
clear foundation for economic accountability 
or growth. As such, by 1969 the contribution 
of the cooperative movement to economic 
development was labelled as ‘insignificant’ 
by Watters (1969:243).
Cooperatives were also severely criticised 
by Spate (1959) for their susceptibility to 
peculation, with many becoming inactive 
in the 1950s—particularly those established 
for their prestige value and those hopeful of 
obtaining government financial assistance 
(Watters 1969). Watters maintained that the 
lack of individual initiative by Fijians in the 
village environment was a major impediment 
to an organisation that was essentially 
an association of individuals for mutual 
benefit. Collectivism was the preferred 
mode of activity, as it represented a form 
of entrepreneurship that led to economic 
rewards without resorting to individualistic, 
small-scale production and marketing.
Rural reform: independent (galala) 
farmers and the modernisation of 
agriculture
Fiji has undergone a series of rural reform 
programs that included policies to establish 
cooperative societies in the 1940s, the galala 
program or ‘independent farmer’ initiative 
in the 1960s and large, state-controlled 
agricultural development programs in the 
1970s. The earliest efforts to reform Fiji’s rural 
economy began in the late 1800s and early 
1900s through the Fijian administration, 
under which the administration carried 
out a deliberate program of subjugation 
under the label of ‘indirect rule’ (France 
1969; Macnaught 1982; Knapman 1983; 
Naidu 1992). Indirect rule institutionalised 
the Fijian hierarchical élite (chiefs), thereby 
giving wider acceptance and legitimacy to 
state policies. An example was the policy 
that restricted the movement of indigenous 
Fijians to and from their villages.
This policy not only restricted Fijians to 
their villages, it bound them to work on the 
land at the will of their local chiefs in order 
to pay taxes; Fijians had to seek exemptions 
to take up commercial agriculture or other 
types of business activity. Formal approval 
to move out of the village had to be gained 
from the district headman (buli) or provincial 
headman (roko), giving evidence of £100 
annual income and ownership of 3 acres of 
cultivated land. Those moving out of the 
village were also required to pay in advance 
a fee and an additional commutation rate of 
£1 per annum to compensate the village 
for the loss of their services (Macnaught 
1982). Many applicants were rejected or 
had their permission revoked after annual 
inspections. There was no financial or 
technical support for farmers who left 
the village and little encouragement was 
given to undertake the risks of commercial 
agriculture (Frazer 1973).
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One of the reasons for restricting the 
movement of indigenous Fijian villagers 
was the development of a dual economy: 
sugar, which was produced by indentured 
Indian labour, and cash crops produced by 
the indigenous population. Between 1875 
and 1902, income from village produce or 
village ‘government gardens’ was collected 
and sold by tender, with part of the proceeds 
credited to the government as tax dues and 
the remainder accumulated as village funds 
(Knapman 1983:112). The taxes required of 
the village Fijians were a tax-in-kind in the 
form of subsistence crop surpluses that were 
passed from the local chiefs to the Native 
Administration and on to the Treasury.
Mobility restrictions on indigenous 
Fijians were relaxed by the time of the 1959 
Spate Report and the 1960 Burns Commission 
Report that heralded an era of modernisation 
and industrialisation. A characteristic of 
this period was the concerted effort to 
modernise the Fijian economy, including 
greater government investment in land-
based projects. More significant was the 
turnaround in approach towards the 
indigenous Fijians. This took the form of 
institutionalising the traditional system of 
galala or farmers who lived away from the 
village, by promoting them as independent 
or free of the burden of obligations. Spate 
drew on comparisons of productivity 
between Fijians and Indian tenants between 
1953 and 1957 that showed the indigenous 
farmers’ yields were consistently below their 
Indian counterparts, with the exception of 
galala farmers, who compared favourably 
(Watters 1969:18–21).
Once again, however, the underlying 
argument for this government policy was 
flawed. According to Ward (1960, 1964, 
1965), the notion that Fijians needed to 
be encouraged to move out of the village 
for their ‘own good’ was at variance with 
pre-colonial activity. Ward pointed out that 
before the restrictions placed on mobility 
by the Fijian administration, it was not 
uncommon for families to shift residence 
from their village and closer to their garden 
areas, particularly in times of peace.
Further, detachment from social 
obligations does not automatically follow 
physical detachment from village life. 
Lasaqa (1980) pointed out that the opposite 
often happened—that improved economic 
development in rural areas had increased 
the Fijians’ ability to meet their obligations. 
Moreover, the galala farmer often had 
greater amounts of time to spend on 
commercial agriculture and therefore had 
a greater capacity to contribute materially 
to the village, resulting in an increase in 
status. Most galala who attended village 
ceremonies became substantial benefactors 
to their villages, supplying bullocks for 
ceremonies, donating money to fundraising 
activities and providing conspicuous gifts 
that brought honour to their villages (Frazer 
1973).
Following the Burns Report’s recom-
mendations, the Fijian government drew 
up ambitious plans to increase sharply the 
area under commercial agriculture, using 
the early drafts of land-use studies of Ward 
(1965) and the soil survey of Twyford and 
Wright (1965). The result was the emergence 
of large-scale agricultural projects such 
as the Uluisaivou Beef Cattle Scheme, the 
Dreketi Irrigation Rice Scheme, the Batiri 
Citrus Project and the Seaqaqa Sugar Cane 
Development Project (Fiji’s largest and most 
expensive effort to increase commercial 
agricultural participation among indigenous 
Fijians). Many of these schemes fell short of 
their intended objectives and their failures, 
according to Overton (1987), were due 
to a lack of understanding of the local 
environmental and social constraints. Lack 
of planning and poor implementation were 
common—even when sound advice was 
commissioned. The Atkins Report (Atkins 
1988), commissioned by the Ministry of 
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Economic Planning and Development, 
proposed a development approach that 
emphasised market-led strategies and 
resource-based development proposals 
that built on existing small-scale, dispersed 
projects.
In summary, state policies on rural 
economic reform and agricultural 
intensification in Fiji from the late 1800s 
until recently have been underpinned by 
an agenda that had the best of intentions 
for the economic development of the 
indigenous population but with little 
understanding of their situation. The focus 
since the 1960s has been on removing or 
mitigating the negative impact of culture on 
economic activity—with minimal impact. 
Fijians continue to value and celebrate their 
traditions and kin relationships in ways 
that can appear extravagant to outsiders. 
Cultural and traditional obligations are 
expensive to maintain. Preserving kin 
relationships was critical to survival in 
traditional, non-capitalist societies. It would 
be rash, however, to underestimate their 
importance in semi-substance societies. 
Where labour and insurance markets are 
uncertain and infrastructure (including 
communications) is underdeveloped, the 
reliance on traditional mechanisms for 
economic security and socio-cultural well-
being will continue until such time as it 
becomes surplus to requirements.
Technical efficiency and stochastic 
frontier analysis
Stochastic frontier analysis of technical 
efficiency was proposed independently by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese 
and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977). The stochastic frontier model 
specification for cross-sectional data can be 
expressed as in Equation 1. 
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In Equation 1, i is the output of the 
 firm,  is a vector of inputs and  is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated. This 
specification allows for a non-negative 
random component in the error term, 
, to generate a measure of technical 
efficiency. The random error, , accounts for 
measurement error and captures random 
variation in output due to factors beyond 
the control of firms, measurement error 
and statistical noise. The error term  is 
assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed ),0( 2vN σ  and  with mean zero and constant variance. The error term  
captures firm-specific technical inefficiency 
in production specified as in Equation 2.
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In Equation 2,  is a (1 × ) vector of 
explanatory variables that can influence 
the efficiency of a firm,  is a (  × 1) vector 
of unknown coefficients and  is a random 
variable such that  is obtained by a non-
negative truncation of . Input 
variables can be included in Equations 1 and 
2 as long as the technical efficiency effects 
are stochastic (Battese and Coelli 1995). The 
technical efficiency of production of the  
farmer in the data-set, given the level of 
inputs, is defined by Equation 3.
  
(3)
48
Pacific Economic BullEtin
 Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 2 © 2010 the australian national university
The measure of technical efficiency 
is based on the conditional expectation 
given by Equation 3, given the values of 
the composite error term evaluated at 
the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters in the model, where the expected 
maximum value of  is conditional on  
(Battese and Coelli 1988). The corresponding 
mean technical efficiency of firms in the 
industry is defined as in Equation 4.
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Data sources
Data for this research were collected from 
21 group meetings with more than 280 
indigenous sugarcane growers, as well 
as a survey of 167 individual growers for 
on-farm data. The survey was conducted 
throughout Fiji’s sugar-producing districts 
over a four-month period between April 
2003 and September 2004. A total of 22 
focus group meetings was carried out 
across randomly selected locations in the 
eight sugar mill districts of Fiji between 
May and September 2003. Of the 235 people 
who attended the focus group meetings, 
178 were registered sugarcane farmers. A 
survey was carried out with the registered 
growers to collect information on the main 
decision maker and family, plus details on 
farm management practices, use of labour 
and farm inputs. Follow-up interviews with 
another 33 individuals were carried out 
with farmers who fell into specific groups 
of interest. Of the 211 farmers surveyed, 42 
respondents who indicated at the time of 
the survey that they would be producing 
sugarcane in 2003 were not on the Fiji 
Sugar Corporation’s (FSC) 2003 database 
of producers. The total number of effective 
respondents was therefore 169. Farmers 
surveyed by sugar-producing district were: 
Lautoka (21), Nadi (6), Sigatoka (4), Ba (49), 
Tavua (1), Penang (54), Seqaqa (33) and 
Labasa (22).
Empirical model specification
This study applies the single-stage estimation 
model proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995). The choice between Cobb-Douglas 
or translog functional forms for Equation 
1 was made using the likelihood ratio (LR) 
test, following Kompas, Che and Grafton 
(2004), with test statistics given by Kodde 
and Palm (1986), defined as Equation 5.
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In Equation 5,  and  are the 
maximised values of the log-likelihood 
functions under and , respectively. 
Given that the null hypothesis is true, 
LRλ R
has an approximate 2 )( Jχ  distribution, where 
 is the number of restrictions under  
Testing the null hypothesis of the Cobb-
Douglas production function against the 
general translog specification was done by 
setting the relevant parameters for squared 
and interactive terms in the translog form 
equal to zero. The resulting test statistic of 
2
3χ = 3.06, compared with a critical value of 
7.04, indicates that we were unable to reject 
the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas at 
a 5 per cent level of significance. The Cobb-
Douglas functional form was thus selected. 
Additional hypothesis tests, following 
Kompas, Che and Grafton (2004), were 
performed to ensure that technical efficiency 
effects matter and that the distribution of 
efficiency terms is half-normal. [Details 
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are available from the authors on request.] 
Note that the estimates of the stochastic 
frontier to follow were also confirmed using 
a ‘random coefficients approach’, following 
Kalirajan and Obwona (1994), allowing 
for the possibility of non-neutral shifts in 
the production frontier. Estimated results 
varied but all technical efficiency rankings 
remained unchanged.
Stochastic production function variables
Definitions for the five input variables 
and four dummy district variations are as 
follows (Table 1). Sugar cane is the total 
volume (metric tonnes) of sugar cane, 
as recorded by the FSC for 2003. This is 
not exactly a measure of total yield, as a 
proportion of farms have ‘standing cane’ 
or non-harvested cane at the end of the 
season. Land is the area harvested and 
includes plant crop area (in hectares) and 
ratoon, normally classified into years one, 
two and three or more years, recorded by the 
FSC for 2003. This figure does not include 
non-productive land or land used for other 
crops. Labour includes the total number 
of hours of family, hired and group labour 
applied to cultivation, planting, fertilising, 
manual or hand weeding, and cleaning or 
dressing the crop before harvesting. The 
amount of herbicide chemical applied was 
not included because of the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate data. Harvesting was 
not included in the labour calculation as the 
majority of farmers indicated that they hired 
substitute cane harvesters. The value of 1 
in this category in Table 1 as the minimum 
number of hours indicates the small number 
of farmers who did not carry out any crop 
maintenance or cultivation during the 2003 
season, yet were able to harvest a crop.
Capital includes a common value (kW) 
for the two most valuable capital items 
of most farmers: bullocks and tractors.3 
Conversion from horsepower (hp) to 
kilowatts (kW) for tractors is 1:0.745 and 
bullock draught power for ploughing 
is estimated at 0.52kW per bullock. For 
example, one 30hp tractor equals 22.37kW 
and two bullocks of approximately 250kg 
in weight equal 2.08kW (Singh and Partap 
1999). Fertiliser is derived from the number 
of bags that the farmer said was applied 
per hectare. Although the FSC has a record 
of the number of bags sold to each farmer, 
these data were not used. Selling bags of 
fertiliser to raise cash is not an uncommon 
practice and therefore farmers were asked 
about the amount that was applied. Land 
quality is a binary variable indicating farms 
with greater than 50 per cent of the total land 
area in flat land.
Variables on districts relate to the 
mill districts, by category—District 1 (7): 
Lautoka Mill; District 2 (8): Rarawai Mill; 
District 3 (9): Labasa Mill; and District 4 
(10): Penang Mill. This variable is a proxy for 
regional differences associated with climatic 
variability across the two main islands of Fiji 
and also the industry infrastructure system 
support for the growers. Each of the mill 
districts is made up of sectors. 
Inefficiency model variables
‘Farm in cane’ is the proportion of the farm 
land planted to cane and is calculated using 
the lease area registered with the FSC for 
sugarcane production and the total area 
harvested. Residence of farmer (value 1) 
is a binary variable indicating whether the 
farmer lives on the farm, otherwise it is zero. 
‘Otherwise’ in this case includes farmers 
who live in a village or village settlements. 
Tractor ownership is a binary variable 
indicating whether a farmer owns a tractor. 
Ownership includes outright ownership 
by an owner-operator or part-ownership 
as a member of a formal or informal 
group arrangement. Farmers who hired 
or borrowed tractors made up the largest 
proportion of the sample (52.9 per cent). 
Reserve land is a binary variable indicating 
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whether the farmer leases reserve land or 
has a vakavanua arrangement (informal 
lease). Information for this variable was 
derived from NLTB and FSC sources. 
Farmer responses were inconsistent and 
showed that the farmers’ knowledge of their 
lease arrangements was not always accurate. 
Membership of a cooperative group is a 
binary variable indicating membership in a 
cooperative; otherwise the farmer lives and 
farms as an individual in a village.
Results and discussion
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model 
(Equations 1 and 2) were obtained using 
FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli 1996). Results for 
the stochastic frontier model are shown in 
Table 2. All estimated input variables are 
significant at the 5 per cent level, except 
for District 4. Input share coefficients sum 
to 0.360, with land quality and regional 
variation contributing 0.598.
The output of sugar cane is highly 
dependent on weather (temperature and 
rainfall distribution). These differences are 
captured in the four district dummy variables 
in the production model. Regional variation 
Table 1 Variables for the stochastic frontier and inefficiency model
Variable Sample 
minimum
Sample 
maximum
Sample 
mean
Sample standard 
deviation
Sugar cane (tonnes) 3.23 477.72 117.24 89.21
Land (hectares) 0.20 12.00 2.92 1.88
Labour (hours per annum) 1.00 2,701.08 542.25 443.34
Capital (kilowatts) 2.08 41.01 16.52 12.52
Fertiliser (kilograms) 1 7200 882.36 961.88
Land quality (binary) 0 1 0.473 0.500
District 1 0 1 0.159 0.367
District 2 0 1 0.289 0.455
District 3 0 1 0.242 0.429
District 4 0 1 0.278 0.449
Efficiency model variables
Farm in cane (per cent) 0.0316 1 0.474 0.294
Reside on farm (binary) 0 1 0.520 0.501
Tractor ownership (binary) 0 1 0.215 0.412
Reserve land (binary) 0 1 0.496 0.501
Cooperative group 
member (binary)
0 1 0.271 0.445
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Table 2 Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the stochastic frontier and 
technical inefficiency models (Equations 8 and 10)
Variable Parameter MLE coefficient MLE 
t-ratio
OLS coefficient OLS 
t-ratio
Stochastic frontier
Constant 1.468 (0.082)*** 17.837 1.209 (0.125) 9.706
LnLand 0.301 (0.024)*** 12.638 0.349 (0.039) 8.863
Land quality 0.096 (0.026)*** 3.663 0.137 (0.043) 3.173
LnLabour 0.018 (0.009)** 1.998 0.007 (0.020) 0.344
LnCapital 0.038 (0.011)*** 3.561 0.019 (0.018) 1.069
LnFertiliser 0.013 (0.004)*** 2.835 –0.001(0.008) –0.124
District 1 0.164 (0.080)** 2.056 0.333 (0.143) 2.334
District 2 0.132 (0.073)** 1.818 0.292 (0.134) 2.173
District 3 0.143 (0.077)** 1.855 0.271 (0.138) 1.965
District 4   0.063 (0.070) 0.899 0.269 (0.137) 1.963
Constant –1.244 (0.783)* –1.589
LnFarm in cane –0.139 (0.063)** –2.215
Residence –1.366 (0.519)*** –2.630
Tractor ownership –0.687 (0.355)** –1.936
Reserve land 0.193 (0.123)* 1.579
Cooperative  
member
–2.813 (1.242)*** –2.265
0.680 (0.244)*** 2.780 0.064
0.991 (0.004)*** 233.203
Ln(likelihood) 48.179 –2.274
Mean efficiency 0.828
Number of 
observations
169
*** statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors; the t-ratio is asymptotic.
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in farmer support infrastructure is also 
captured in the district dummy variables. 
These include the level of government 
assistance (for example, agricultural ministry 
extension services); industry advisory 
services (for example, sugar industry farm 
advisors); and financial assistance (FDB 
loans and other financial services that could 
have regional differences).
Other district factors include the distance 
from the farms to the mills. District 4 is 
the Penang Mill district, which produced 
the lowest t-ratio (less than 0.9). A high 
proportion of the farms included in the 
survey were from two sectors within the 
Penang district and included farms that had 
the greatest distance to transport their cane 
to the mill. The region’s terrain is undulating 
and hilly, limiting rail transport and placing 
greater reliance on road transport.
A high proportion of the farmers in 
these sectors have vakavanua titles or leases 
to reserve lands and therefore do not have 
the degree of security over their land that 
allows them to borrow funds commercially. 
Lack of capital to purchase trucks has seen 
greater reliance on hired transport (almost 
without exception from Indo-Fijian owners). 
These farms are located in the ‘wet belt’ of 
the cane-growing region on the northwest 
coast of Viti Levu and their optimal time for 
harvest is usually earlier than other areas 
(June or July). Reliance on hired transport 
means that harvest is delayed until transport 
is available, often resulting in lost income 
and unrecoverable seasonal costs. 
The results of the technical inefficiency 
model based on the asymptotic t-ratios 
show that residence on a farm (rather 
than in a village or settlement) and being 
a member of a cooperative have a highly 
significant and positive effect on technical 
efficiency (or a highly significant negative 
effect on technical inefficiency). Percentages 
of ‘farm under cane’ and tractor ownership 
are significant at the 5 per cent level. Reserve 
land has a positive sign, which indicates a 
positive effect on technical inefficiency (at 
the 10 per cent level). Gamma  = 0.99) is 
significant, indicating substantial variance 
in inefficiency across farms; and the mean 
efficiency of indigenous Fijian farmers is 
82.8 per cent.
The proportion of the farm planted to 
cane is significant, supporting the argument 
that farmers with greater investment in sugar 
cane are more likely to be better producers. 
Tractor ownership is less significant than 
the other variables but it does indicate that 
greater capital investment in machinery 
improves technical efficiency. Farmers with 
bullocks might be able to farm profitably 
and sustainably on small blocks but the 
physical demands of manual ploughing are 
an issue for farmers who are, on average, 
close to 50 years old. Additionally, farmers 
with bullocks are more likely to be subjected 
to requests from family to donate their 
bullocks to village ceremonies. 
Reserve land is significant and its 
positive sign indicates that farmers with 
formal leases on reserve land (Class J) or 
informal arrangements on reserve land 
are less technically efficient. These lease 
arrangements can be problematic for 
farmers, particularly with the restrictions 
imposed when applying for loans. Lack 
of credit security (collateral) on vakavanua 
and Class J leases has led to increasing 
pressure from financial institutions and 
the government for landowners to convert 
to agricultural leases (Class A), which 
are under the administrative control of 
the NLTB. Membership of a cooperative 
group (either formal or informal) is highly 
significant. We defer discussion of this result 
to a later section.
Farm profiles by efficiency rankings
The farm-level efficiency measures from the 
frontier estimates, combined with the farm 
characteristics from the survey data, provide 
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a profile of indigenous Fijian sugarcane 
farmers by efficiency ranking (Table 3). 
Following Kompas and Che (2006), these 
rankings are arbitrarily divided into ‘low’ 
(25 to 82 per cent), ‘medium’ (82 to 92 per 
cent) and ‘high’ (93 per cent and higher).
Caution has to be taken with the 
interpretation of the results, since the 
correspondence of the farm characteristics 
with high or low efficiency levels could be 
coincidental and not causal. The results 
from the inefficiency model in Table 2 are 
thus more precise and should condition 
the overall conclusions gained from these 
profiles. Noteworthy features of Table 3 are 
the differences in area harvested between 
the high performers and the medium and 
low efficiency performers (an average of 23 
Table 3 Summary characteristics of efficiency groups
Average value of farm features Unit Efficiency of farm group
Low 
<25–81%
Medium 
82–92%
High 
>93%
Total output 60.3 114.1 199.7
Land area ha 2.7 2.7 3.5
Yield (tonnes of sugar cane per hectare) Tsc/ha 24.5 43.2 61.6
Area of farm planted in sugar cane % 42.4 49.1 50.8
Area of ratoon cane replanted % 5.6 17.5 24.9
Land quality (1 = flat; 2 = rolling; 3 = steep) 1.5 1.4 1.7
Total annual labour hours per hectare hrs/ha 170.0 203.7 198.4
Chemical (herbicide) used by farmers % 36.4 55.1 54.8
Fertiliser (kilograms) per hectare kg/ha 312.2 259.2 318.4
Reserve or vakavanua lease % 53.7 47.1 48.8
Tractor used (hired or borrowed) % 77.8 51.6 75.7
Tractor owned by farmer or group % 14.3 21.7 31.0
Age of farmer yrs 50.1 47.2 51.0
Farming experience yrs 13.7 15.9 17.3
Contract with FSC yrs 14.2 13.9 15.1
School years yrs 8.3 8.0 7.2
Cash crops % 27.3 35.8 23.8
Reside on farm % 42.9 53.6 61.9
Tertiary qualifications % 10.5 2.9 2.4
Trade or technical skills % 29.8 17.1 21.4
Non-farm income % 15.8 8.6 21.4
Member of landowning unit % 80.4 74.3 68.3
Member of management group % 17.5 20.3 18.4
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per cent) as well as the higher total output 
and yield. Medium producers, on average, 
have yields 43 per cent higher than low 
performers and the yields of high performers 
are 30 per cent higher than those of medium 
performers. The proportion of land in cane 
is not noticeably different between the high 
and medium performers, but the proportion 
of ratoon cane that has been replaced with 
plant cane is significant. Land quality, while 
significant in the efficiency model (Table 2), 
is not a significant qualitative characteristic 
that distinguishes efficiency groups.
The total number of annual labour 
hours per hectare shows no significant 
difference between the three efficiency 
groups. This is confirmed from the estimates 
of the efficiency model. Use of chemicals 
for weed control was dropped from the 
efficiency model because of its low level 
of significance. The efficiency groupings, 
however, show a marked increase in the 
use of chemicals by the medium and high 
performers in comparison with the low 
performers (an increase of 34 per cent). 
Fertiliser application shows no significant 
difference between the groups.
Tractor use by the three groups 
shows no noticeable difference but tractor 
ownership is significantly higher among 
the high performers (31 per cent of high 
performers compared with 14.3 per cent of 
low performers). Years of farming experience 
increase with the higher performers but there 
is no significant difference in the number of 
years of supplying sugar cane to the FSC. 
The proportion of farmers who reside on 
their farms or in settlements increases with 
the improvement in technical efficiency 
(an increase of 21 per cent between low 
and medium performers and an increase 
13.4 per cent between medium and high 
performers).
Farmers with tertiary qualifications are 
represented more among the low performers 
(10.5 per cent compared with 2.4 per cent for 
high performers). While the overall number of 
farmers with tertiary qualifications is low, this 
result indicates that farmers with alternative 
skills are likely to seek off-farm employment. 
This interpretation is corroborated by the 
higher number of low-efficiency farmers 
with trade or technical skills (29.8 per cent 
compared with 21.4 per cent of higher 
performers). Of interest, however, is the 
higher number of high performers with non-
farm income (21.4 per cent).
In the efficiency model results (Table 
2), farming on reserve land (Class J leases) 
or with vakavanua arrangements had a 
significantly negative influence on technical 
efficiency (at the 5 per cent level). This result 
is supported by the slightly higher number 
of farmers in the low-efficiency group. The 
low number of farmers in the low-efficiency 
group who own tractors is also corroborated 
by the results of the efficiency model.
Cooperative group membership
Returning to Table 2, membership of a 
cooperative group produced a significant 
result in improving technical efficiency 
(t-ratio = –2.26). This outcome highlights 
several key issues that require further 
clarification. We address many of the reasons 
and qualifications for added efficiency 
from cooperative group membership in 
the remainder of this article. As a matter 
of definition, there are two types of group 
membership: formal and informal. Most 
informal groups (often referred to as 
cooperatives by the growers) are formed 
primarily to pool resources to purchase a 
tractor or other capital items that would be 
too expensive for an individual. This adds 
to efficiency. Land leases are kept separate, 
membership is voluntary and there is no 
mechanism to coordinate production. 
While this is effective as a mechanism to 
raise capital, these groups are subject to the 
problem of common ownership—that is, 
communal assets are open to abuse. In this 
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sense, formal groups had several distinct 
advantages over informal arrangements.
Cooperative group membership and 
cultural alignment. Food production for 
subsistence use is undertaken by individual 
families on individually delineated areas 
of land. Labour is supplied in the main by 
the family and the extended family with 
contributions from members of itokatoka 
for labour-intensive functions such as 
planting and harvest when large numbers 
of volunteers are needed to carry out 
important activities in a short period. In 
these instances, the wider landowning unit 
(mataqali) is called on for assistance.
The Fijian term for cooperative labour 
is ‘solesolevaki’, drawing on traditional 
practices of cooperation and reciprocity that 
are built on the maintenance and respect 
of kinship ties. The recent emergence of 
cooperative or group farming structures 
among Fiji’s indigenous sugarcane growers 
and its widespread acceptance has been 
credited largely to the incorporation of the 
cultural concept of solesolevaki into economic 
activity. Superimposing a traditional 
concept on a contemporary context can be 
problematic as the traditional concept of 
solesolevaki was based on the participants 
having an equitable (or negotiable) stake 
in the communally owned resources. 
Property rights were fluid and rights to 
land were allocated according to a set 
of criteria that took into account family 
requirements. Since the codification of Fijian 
land and allocation, in the form of leases 
or traditional arrangements (vakavanua), is 
often fixed for long periods, problems can 
occur with inequitable distribution. This is 
often the case with mataqali members who 
have an agricultural lease and are seen as a 
privileged minority within the mataqali.
Notwithstanding this consideration, 
the integration of a concept that reflects 
traditional values of reciprocity and 
cooperation with economic activity has 
had an interesting effect on the indigenous 
rural population. The result is a cultural 
alignment—or the alignment of individual 
economic activity with collective wealth. 
More significantly, this alignment also 
allows individual farmers to cope with the 
conflicts associated with mixed objectives. 
Shifting the focus from the individual to the 
group provides a more acceptable cultural 
context from which Fijian farmers are able to 
carry out dual roles. The first is as a member 
of the clan (mataqali) with the responsibilities 
and obligations of tribal membership. The 
second is as an individual economic agent. 
These roles seldom sit comfortably side 
by side in societies that are undergoing a 
transition from a subsistence existence to 
full participation in the market economy. 
The interaction between cultural legitimacy, 
group membership and establishing 
conditions that motivate individual farmer 
behaviour is complex. The incorporation 
of cultural concepts and practices in the 
organisation’s mode of practice improves 
its acceptability with the wider social unit. 
Farmers belonging to a group in which 
the resources are collectively owned seem 
to have greater acceptance and are likely 
to be better motivated to expend effort 
in commercial production that has both 
individual and group benefits (Kingi 2006a, 
2006b). This, again, adds to efficiency.
The argument for greater cultural 
alignment is supported by Overton (1999), 
who argues for greater recognition of 
traditional systems in what he calls the 
‘vakavanua discourse’ that focuses on 
customary Fijian models and local-level 
activities. The term vakavanua translates 
as ‘the way of the land’ and often refers to 
customary methods of land distribution. Its 
use also, however, refers to practices that are 
bound to the land and are specific to a region 
or locality. Similarly, the word vanua has 
multiple meanings, which include land and 
place (Ravuvu 1987) as well as the people 
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in that place and the values and beliefs 
that people in a particular locality have in 
common. Increasing cultural alignment and 
paying greater attention to local values and 
beliefs are reflected in the acceptance and 
coordination between the leadership of the 
cooperative organisation and the leadership 
of the mataqali and yavusa. Congruency 
between tribal leadership and organisational 
leadership increases the cultural legitimacy 
of the organisation, improves planning 
and minimises the negative effects of 
ceremonial and traditional obligations on 
farm programs. Legitimate leadership of a 
farming group increases group status and 
cultural acceptance, shifting the emphasis 
from individual economic activity to one 
where activity and benefits are shared 
within the community.
The benefits of cultural alignment can be 
seen in the case of the Naleiwavuwavu Cane 
Development Scheme (NCDS) in Sabeto 
(NLTB 2003), where the organisation’s 
leadership is closely aligned with the 
leadership of the yavusa. A deliberate 
effort is made to encourage village elders 
to participate in the organisation to ‘blend 
tradition and farming’. Including village 
leadership in the organisation also assists 
in the planning of seasonal tasks. Village 
involvement in the organisation minimises 
ceremonial and traditional obligations on 
farm programs. The organisation brings 
together landowners and farmers and 
communal activity and, according to 
the NCDS manager, is ‘culturally more 
acceptable…it’s a blend of culture, traditions 
and business’. Legitimate leadership of a 
farming group gives the group status in the 
eyes of the village and cultural acceptance, 
shifting the emphasis from individual 
economic activity to one where activity and 
benefits are shared within the community.
Cooperative group membership 
and centralised management. While 
the previous section described the socio-
cultural advantages of group membership 
and their influences on the individual 
farmer ’s motivation and congruency 
with traditional tribal social structures, 
this section describes the direct, tangible 
factors that impact on the farm business. 
Taken together, these two sections provide 
a reasonable explanation for increases in 
the technical efficiency of growers who are 
members of a cooperative group.
The first contributing factor is that 
cooperative group membership provides 
a mechanism to overcome collectively 
problems that an individual farmer might 
face, particularly a farmer who is new 
to commercial production. Government 
support of the sugar industry has been 
rationalised in an effort to lower transaction 
costs and the risk of loan defaults for the 
financial sector by requiring new entrants 
to be a member of a group. This is also a 
precondition for lending or for financial 
assistance in the form of establishment 
grants. Cooperative group membership 
therefore acts as a communal security 
mechanism similar to social collateral 
micro-finance institutions (MFIs) such 
as the Grameen Bank (Goldberg 2005). 
Group monitoring reduces the financial 
risks associated with borrowing funds to 
purchase expensive capital items—such 
as a tractor—and reduces the likelihood 
of default.
A key advantage of group membership 
is the pooling of resources so that the 
purchase of expensive capital items 
can be spread over a larger number of 
individual farms. There are a number of 
such mechanisms in practice in Fiji but one 
that is gaining in popularity is where the 
individual leaseholders—usually from the 
same mataqali or a neighbouring mataqali 
within the same yavusa—amalgamate 
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their leases under a central management 
system. The leases remain independent 
but an agreement is drawn up in which the 
lessee agrees to participate in a ‘scheme’. 
A fee is paid to the central system to cover 
administration functions and in some cases 
a lump sum investment to purchase capital 
items. These payments are either borrowed 
funds or establishment grants. The result is 
greater efficiency in capital resources but at 
a higher risk to the lessee of agency costs.
T h e  p ro m o t i o n  o f  c e n t r a l i s e d 
management systems is not a new concept 
in the Pacific.  Ward and Proctor (1980) 
suggested a wider application of plantation 
management systems because they had 
several advantages over smallholder farming 
systems, under specific conditions. Ward and 
Proctor observed that farmers were often 
able to meet the demands of the market and 
earn much higher than average incomes 
and therefore recommended the adoption 
of a centralised system in which farmers 
aggregated landholdings under the central 
control of a single management system.
Contract farming. An underlying 
reason for Ward and Proctor’s centralised 
management system was that it provided 
a mechanism that was no longer subject to 
the influences of traditional right holders—
that is, the structure limited the claims 
of communal owners over communal 
resources. Individuals are at much higher 
risk of acquiescing to requests for goods/
products than an organisational structure 
(assuming effective internal checks and 
controls). The corollary of this argument 
is the need for a structure that buffers the 
influences of culture on economic activity.
The advantage of a centralised decision-
making and management system is the 
formation of a mechanism that coordinates 
labour and ensures the efficient use of 
expensive capital items. For inexperienced 
growers, the responsibility of farm planning 
is shifted to an experienced individual 
or group of kin farmers in charge of 
coordination and management. Membership 
of a group lowers the production risk for 
the individual. In return, they are expected 
to contribute their labour when group 
activities are scheduled and to maintain a 
financial contribution to the running of the 
group’s administrative function.
The step from centralised management 
to contract farming is an option open to the 
lessees and the group structures that have 
the requisite internal capability. Cooperative 
groups that evolve into a system in which 
activities are carried out on each of the farms 
with minimal input from the individual 
leaseholder are already emerging. This 
arrangement allows the lessee to live in 
the village or on the farm but to have 
the freedom to participate in communal 
activities as and when required. The contract 
farmer is able to take advantage of labour 
planning and management scheduling to 
also benefit from the amalgamation of leases 
into a contiguous single production unit 
with increased scale efficiencies.
Policy implications and  
final remarks
This study indicates that cooperative group 
membership could provide a mechanism 
to overcome problems that an individual 
farmer might face. In particular, increased 
technical efficiency was seen as a likely 
result of cultural alignment and centralising 
of management decision making to improve 
the coordination of farm inputs and the 
management of labour. Increased cultural 
legitimacy based on traditional concepts such 
as solesolevaki improves social acceptability—
that is, growers who are members of a group 
in which the resources are collectively 
owned seem to have greater acceptance 
and therefore much greater motivation 
to focus effort and resources. Groups 
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with centralised management systems 
that choose to amalgamate leases into a 
contiguous single production unit are likely 
to benefit from scale efficiencies and the 
pooling of resources to purchase expensive 
capital items. A single organisation also 
improves access to debt finance and lowers 
transaction and administrative costs. In 
addition, the movement to centralised 
decision-making enables the transition 
to contract farming in which key farm 
management activities can be carried out 
with minimal input from the individual 
leaseholder, or the entire production system 
carried out under contract. 
An important proviso, however, is the 
need for capable, skilled and experienced 
leaders and managers of these organisations. 
Communal ownership of a cooperative’s 
resources without adequate control can lead 
to multiple claims and misuse of important 
assets. Sharing of farm implements is 
common among Fijian farmers and in spite 
of past experiences of mistreated machinery 
many farmers are reluctant to decline a 
request from kin. Group ownership of 
assets shifts responsibility for the item from 
the individual, and this must be managed 
effectively.
Although the efficiency gains from a 
centralised structure can be advantageous, 
they do not come without risks. One of the 
key issues facing a formal management group 
is the potential for corruption and agency 
problems to emerge if stringent controls are 
not put in place. In the absence of a system 
that promotes transparency of information 
and holds the organisational leadership 
accountable to its main stakeholders—the 
farmers—serious problems are likely to 
occur.
While these organisations have shown 
the capacity to improve the technical 
efficiency of indigenous cane farmers 
and provide a mechanism for capital 
accumulation, their effectiveness outside the 
sugar industry is unknown. The sugarcane 
farming system lends itself favourably to 
a centralised management system. Crops 
with greater husbandry requirements 
(that is, higher technical skills) are less 
likely to respond to a mechanised farming 
approach.
In summary, these forms of organisation 
have potential to provide an effective 
structural mechanism for Fijian agriculture. 
Widespread promotion of them as a panacea 
for the economic development problems 
facing Fiji’s rural indigenous population 
should, however, be avoided. Centralised 
management systems are likely to be more 
applicable to particular farming systems than 
others; but wherever they are applied, the 
quality of leadership and governance will be 
crucial in minimising agency problems.
Notes
1 The leases were established under the 
Agricultural and Landlord Tenants Act 1976 
(ALTA) and the Native Lands Trust Act 
(NLTA), which has been in place since the 
establishment of the NLTB in 1940. Under 
ALTA, tenants held 30-year leases with the 
NLTB and the lease rent was fixed at 6 per 
cent of the unimproved capital value (UCV). 
Since the expiration of the ALTA leases—
beginning in 1997—all land transactions are 
now administered by the NLTB under the 
NLTA. Under the NLTA, tenants have no right 
of renewal but all new leases are for a ‘rolling’ 
five to 10-year term (up to a maximum of 50 
years) and can be offered on a sharecropping 
basis. Rent is established by the NLTB to 
reflect the ‘market price’ (Lal, Lim-Applegate 
and Reddy 2001:16).
2 Recent literature evaluating cooperatives 
in developing and transitional countries 
includes: Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam 
(2005); Ozdemir (2005); Lerman (2004); 
Bezlepkina, Oskam, Lansink and Huirne 
(2004); Alvarez (2005); Sabates-Wheeler (2002); 
and Burger (2001).
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3 The lack of accurate data on the monetary 
value of farmers’ assets (for example, houses, 
vehicles, bullocks, tractors and other farm 
implements) meant that a capital value could 
be estimated only from a common power 
factor between bullocks and tractors.
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